Bitcoin: A Natural Oligopoly by Arnosti, Nick & Weinberg, S. Matthew
Bitcoin: A Natural Oligopoly
Nick Arnosti∗ Matt Weinberg†
November 22, 2018
Abstract
Although Bitcoin was intended to be a decentralized digital currency, in practice,
mining power is quite concentrated. This fact is a persistent source of concern for the
Bitcoin community.
We provide an explanation using a simple model to capture miners’ incentives to
invest in equipment. In our model, n miners compete for a prize of fixed size. Each
miner chooses an investment qi, incurring cost ciqi, and then receives reward
qαi∑
j q
α
j
, for
some α ≥ 1. When ci = cj for all i, j, and α = 1, there is a unique equilibrium where
all miners invest equally. However, we prove that under seemingly mild deviations from
this model, equilibrium outcomes become drastically more centralized. In particular,
• When costs are asymmetric, if miner i chooses to invest, then miner j has market
share at least 1 − cjci . That is, if miner j has costs that are (e.g.) 20% lower
than those of miner i, then miner j must control at least 20% of the total mining
power.
• In the presence of economies of scale (α > 1), every market participant has a
market share of at least 1 − 1α , implying that the market features at most αα−1
miners in total.
We discuss the implications of our results for the future design of cryptocurren-
cies. In particular, our work further motivates the study of protocols that minimize
“orphaned” blocks, proof-of-stake protocols, and incentive compatible protocols.
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1 Introduction
In the ten years since Bitcoin was introduced by [Nak08], cryptocurrencies have become
increasingly mainstream, accounting for hundreds of billions of dollars in market capital-
ization1 and increasing amounts of media coverage. The protocol underlying Bitcoin is
undoubtedly clever, and has largely succeeded in creating a public yet anonymized record
of transactions. However, Bitcoin has largely failed to deliver on one key promise: that of
true decentralization. While there there is nothing in Bitcoin’s source code that enforces
centralized control (as opposed to e.g. Visa, which is centralized by design), Bitcoin’s
record of transactions is in fact dictated by a small number of participants. More specif-
ically, Bitcoin relies on entities called “miners” to record and verify transactions. Today,
a majority of transactions are verified by one of four large “mining pools.”2 For reasons
discussed below, this concentration of power has caused great concern among the Bitcoin
community, and prompted some to argue forcefully for new cryptocurrencies. For example,
one recent whitepaper wrote3
Bitcoin’s creator, Satoshi Nakamoto, intended for the bitcoin network to be fully
decentralized, but nobody could have predicted that the incentives provided by
Proof of Work systems would result in the centralization of the mining process.
One reason that centralization of mining power might be considered unexpected is that
mining rewards exhibit decreasing marginal gains: the more invested one currently is in
Bitcoin mining, the less one has to gain from additional investment. This is because each
new mining device reduces the rewards earned by all existing devices. Our paper shows
that this force is generally dwarfed by two other factors: asymmetric costs and economies
of scale.
In the context of Bitcoin, mining costs are closely related to the cost of electricity, which
varies substantially with geography. Most bitcoin mining is based in China, where some of
the cheapest electricity in the world can be found near underutilized hydroelectric plants.4
Economies of scale arise naturally due to non-linearity in the cost of storing, powering, and
cooling hardware, and also potentially due to strategic behavior [ES14, KKKT16, SSZ16,
BDOZ12, CKWN16, Eya15]. Our main results demonstrate that even seemingly small cost
imbalances or super-linear scaling of reward with investment result in a highly concentrated
market for bitcoin mining. In particular,
• Corollary 2 states that if one agent can acquire computational power at, say, 20%
lower cost than another, then if the less efficient agent chooses a non-zero investment,
the more efficient agent must control at least 20% of all computational power.
1Source: www.coinmarketcap.com.
2Source: https://blockchain.info/pools?timespan=4days.
3Source: https://bravenewcoin.com/assets/Whitepapers/NxtWhitepaper-v122-rev4.pdf.
4Source: https://www.coinbureau.com/analysis/much-bitcoin-mining-concentrated-china/.
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• Theorem 2 states that when rewards are proportional to each agent’s investment
raised to some power α > 1, then in every equilibrium, at most 1+ 1α−1 agents choose
to invest at all.
Below, we provide a brief overview of the relevant aspects of Bitcoin before proceeding
to describe our model and main results.
1.1 What is Bitcoin Mining?
Bitcoin was designed to replace centralized “digital currencies” like Paypal or Visa. While
many people (including the authors) are perfectly happy to use these systems, others are
repulsed at the thought of their transaction fees going to a corporate CEO, or are concerned
that the US government might pressure an organization to freeze a user’s funds or reveal
their transaction history. The promise of Bitcoin was that no single entity would be in
control of the ledger, but instead millions of miners in a peer-to-peer network would each
contribute to maintaining a record of past transactions, also known as a “ledger.”
There are two fundamental challenges facing Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies. First,
how to ensure consistency among the many copies of the transaction history? Second,
how to incentivize users to store and update this information? Achieving consensus is a
notoriously difficult problem studied by computer scientists for several decades [FLP85,
LSP82, SPL80], and is especially challenging in permissionless environments (where users
can anonymously join and leave as they please).
In order to ensure consistency, the Bitcoin protocol makes it difficult to amend the
ledger. In particular, each “block” of new transactions must be accompanied by the solution
to a cryptopuzzle. The puzzle is designed in such a way that the fastest way to find a
solution is simply to guess at random,5 so agents are selected to add to the ledger in
proportion to their computational power.
In order to compensate agents for expenses associated with solving cryptopuzzles, the
Bitcoin protocol gives a “block reward” (currently 12.5 bitcoin) to agents who solve a
puzzle. Users may also include an optional transaction fee that is also paid to the miner
whose block authorizes their transaction. The process of randomly guessing solutions to
a cryptopuzzle in search of rewards is referred to as mining, and agents who participate
in this process are called miners – terminology that we adopt in the remainder of the
paper. Importantly, the Bitcoin protocol has a hard-coded “difficulty adjustment” for the
cryptopuzzles so that one is solved every ten minutes in expectation, regardless of how
much total computational power is in the network.
While the Bitcoin protocol has indeed succeeded in attracting miners to maintain con-
sistent copies of the transaction ledger, it is questionable whether this ledger can be con-
sidered “decentralized.” At the time of writing, four mining pools account for more than
5At least this is widely believed to be the case, and is true under the assumption that SHA-256 is an
ideal hash function [NBF+16].
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half of all blocks, and six mining pools account for more than three-quarters of all blocks.
While the hardware behind a mining pool is not owned by a single entity, a recent study
concluded that eleven “large mining organizations” control over half of global mining power
[HR17]. These miners could in principle freeze any user’s funds, or wipe past transactions
from the record (for more information on how this could happen, see [NBF+16]).
1.2 Overview of Results
The discussion above highlights several key features of the Bitcoin protocol, which form the
basis for our model: (1) The total value of rewards available to miners is fixed.6 (2) Miners
make costly investments in computational power. (3) Miners are rewarded (roughly) in
proportion to their computational power. The simplest model capturing these features is
as follows:
• There is a fixed reward of value 1 to be split among n miners.
• Each miner i decides on computational power to acquire, qi, incurring cost cqi.
• Miner i receives reward qi∑
j qj
.
In this model, there is a unique equilibrium where each miner invests the same amount,
and possesses a 1/n fraction of total mining power (see Corollary 1). This decentralized
outcome arises because investment in mining power exhibits diminishing marginal returns.
Additional investment lowers the value of earlier investments — in the extreme case, if one
is already responsible for 100% of the computational power, there is no marginal gain from
increased mining power.
In practice, of course, costs are not perfectly symmetric nor perfectly proportional to
mining hardware. Still, so long as both assumptions are “approximately” satisfied, one
might reasonably conjecture that mining power should remain distributed among many
parties. Our main (qualitative) message is that seemingly minor departures from these
assumptions result in surprisingly high levels of centralization.
In Section 3, we introduce a model with asymmetric costs and rewards proportional to
investment, and show that there is a unique equilibrium (Theorem 1). Corollary 2 states
that if miners i and j both purchase mining equipment in this equilibrium, and miner i
has per-unit costs that are x% lower than those of miner j, then miner i must possess at
6Technically, payout to miners is determined by both the block reward and by transaction fees. For
most of Bitcoin’s history (including the present day), transaction fees have been trivially small compared
to the block reward (although this was not the case for a brief period in late 2017 and early 2018 –
see https://bitinfocharts.com/comparison/bitcoin-transactionfees.html). Additionally, [HLM17]
observe that the fees paid in equilibrium should depend only on the throughput of the network, the number
of users who want to send transactions, and their delay costs, and not on miners’ investment decisions.
Therefore, it’s reasonable to treat the prize shared by miners as exogenous to their behavior. We discuss
this point further in the conclusion.
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least x% of the total computational power. We further provides a few examples to help the
reader appreciate that with even moderate cost asymmetries, this results in most mining
power being controlled by only a few miners.
In Section 4, we model economies of scale by assuming that rewards are proportional
to qαi for some α > 1. This captures the fact that powering and cooling equipment is
cheaper on a per-unit basis, as well as the fact that clever deviations from the mining
protocol possibly allow large miners to earn more than his or her “fair share” of rewards.7
In this case, the results of Corollary 2 grow even starker. Absent economies of scale, it
was possible for many miners to participate so long as their costs were sufficiently similar.
With economies of scale, we show in Corollary 4 that each participant must have a market
share of at least 1 − 1/α, implying that the number of participants in equilibrium is at
most αα−1 , even if all miners have identical costs. In other words, even if α = 100/99 —
implying that the second piece of mining hardware costs 98.6% as much as the first – then
in equilibrium, every miner who chooses to participate will earn at least 1% of all rewards.
Sections 3 and 4 require almost no background knowledge of cryptocurrencies, and
provide standalone insight to centralization in markets where agents compete over a fixed
prize. In Section 5, we discuss the impact of our results for the future design of cryp-
tocurrencies. Our main conclusion is that the currently-observed concentration of mining
power is not a temporary aberration, but rather a natural result of the economic incentives
established by Bitcoin and other “proof of work” based protocols.
2 Related Work
There are two classes of related works to discuss. The first concerns academic and non-
academic writing about Bitcoin, which touches on some of the themes explored here, but
bears no mathematical resemblance to our work. The second consists of existing literature
on “rent-seeking contests”, which is mathematically closely related to our work but does
not discuss cryptocurrencies.
2.1 Cryptocurrencies
Numerous sources have empirically documented high levels of concentration in Bitcoin
mining. The most frequently-cited statistics come from publicly available data on large
mining pools.8 At the time of writing, four mining pools are responsible for over 50% of
mined blocks, and six are responsible for over 75%. While these statistics are staggering,
7One could explicitly model each of these factors by assuming that when miner i acquires computing
power qi, he or she pays a cost ciq
β
i and earns a reward of q
α′
i /
∑
j q
α′
j , for some β < 1 < α
′. A simple
change of variables reveals that this is strategically equivalent to our model with α = α′/β, so we work
with this simpler representation.
8https:blockchain.info/pools?timespan=4days .
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an informed reader might observe that pool managers do not own all of the the hardware
mining on their behalf, and argue that these numbers are therefore misleading.
Other measures of centralization are not publicly available, and are often intentionally
obscured. Nevertheless, prior work has concluded that 56% of Bitcoin nodes9 exist in large
data centers [GBE+18], and that approximately 100 nodes are responsible for the initial
announcement of 75% all blocks. Even more pertinent to our work is a recent report on the
distribution of mining power, which identifies eleven “large mining entities” and estimates
that they collectively control a majority of global computational power dedicated to Bitcoin
mining [HR17].
2.2 Market Participation
Our model is formally identical to that proposed by [Tul80]. That paper prompted a large
literature on “imperfectly discriminating contests” (so-named to highlight the contrast
with the “perfectly discriminating contest” of an all-pay auction). Most of the follow-up
literature focuses on the extent of rent dissipation – that is, comparing expenses incurred
by contestants to the value of the prize. Two papers [HR89, Gra95] explicitly address
the number of entrants, as we do. Proposition 5 in [HR89] is similar to our Theorem 1,
although it does not explicitly characterize the market share of each participant. [Gra95]
assumes that costs are drawn iid, and shows that as the number of potential entrants n
grows, the fraction who choose to enter in equilibrium converges to zero. Later, he also
considers a variant of the model in which entrants incur a small fixed cost.
Our contribution relative to [HR89, Gra95] is three-fold. First, we provide an ar-
guably cleaner characterization of equilibrium via Theorem 1. Second, we study the case
of economies of scale (α > 1), whereas those papers focus only on the proportional model,
and therefore have no analog to Theorem 2 or Corollary 4. Third, we introduce these
tools to the TCS community via connection to Bitcoin mining, and note that they have
implications for the design of future cryptocurrencies.
3 Asymmetric Costs and Proportional Rewards
In this section, we consider a model with asymmetric costs and rewards proportional to
investment, which we refer to as the proportional model, and observe that the symmetry in
the toy model of Section 1 is crucial for a decentralized equilibrium. Formally, our model
is the following: There are n ≥ 2 miners competing for a prize of value 1. First, each miner
i chooses an investment level qi, paying cost ciqi to do so. Then miners earn market share
in proportion to qi (specifically, miner i receives reward qi/
∑
j qj). The costs ci > 0 are
common knowledge. Without loss of generality, assume that c1 ≤ c2 ≤ · · · ≤ cn, and define
9A node listens for transactions and blocks, and forwards them to the rest of the network (additionally
checking for validity before forwarding).
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cn+1 =∞ for ease of notation. The utility for miner i when investments are given by q is
Ui(q) = xi(q)− ciqi,
where xi(q) = qi/
∑
j qj , and xi(q) = 0 for all i if qi = 0 for all i. The main result of this
section characterizes a unique equilibrium outcome. To state this outcome, we define
X(c) =
∑
i
max(1− ci/c, 0). (1)
Lemma 1. There is a unique value c∗ satisfying X(c∗) = 1, and c∗ > c2.
Proof. Observe that X is continuous and non-decreasing in c. Furthermore, X is strictly
increasing on [c1,∞), with X(c2) = 1− c1/c2 < 1 and limc→∞X(c) = n.
Theorem 1. In the proportional model, there is a unique pure strategy equilibrium. In it,
qi =
1
c∗ max(1− ci/c∗, 0), and xi(q) = max(1− ci/c∗, 0).
Note that c∗ serves as a participation threshold: miners invest in equilibrium if and
only if their cost is less than c∗. The total amount of mining hardware purchased is 1/c∗.
Theorem 1 immediately implies the following corollaries, stated in Section 1.
Corollary 1. In the proportional model, if miners have identical costs (c = c1 = c2 =
· · · = cn), then all n miners participate and invest such that qici = n−1n2 for all i.
Corollary 2. In the proportional model, if miner i participates at all in the unique equi-
librium (that is, qi > 0), then xj(q) ≥ 1− cjci for all `. That is, the market share of miner
` is at least 1− cjci .
Proof. By Theorem 1, xj(q) = 1− cj/c∗ and ci < c∗ for any miner who participates.
One way to think about Corollary 2 is as follows. Suppose that we wish to know
whether miner k will participate in equilibrium. For each lower-cost miner, ask “by what
percentage are this miner’s costs lower than those of miner k?” Miner k will participate if
and only if the sum of these percentages is less than 100. For example, if there are three
miners with costs that are 20% lower than k’s, and five more with costs that are 10% lower,
then k will not participate, as 3× 20 + 5× 10 = 110 > 100.
Before proving Theorem 1, we provide a few quick examples illustrating the degree of
centralization with various cost structures. Each of these examples is designed so that costs
are “not too different.” In the first example, all n miners have costs at most twice that of
the most efficient miner, and yet only 7 miners choose to participate.
Example 1. Let ci = i/(i + 1). We have c7 < c
∗ ≈ 0.88 < c8, so 7 miners participate.
Moreover, c7 = 7/8, so we can immediately conclude from Corollary 2 that miner 1 controls
more than 1− 1/27/8 = 3/7 of the market. Miner 2 controls more than 1− 2/37/8 = 5/21 of the
market, so jointly, they control more than 2/3 of the market.
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In the following example, all n miners participate, but mining power is highly concen-
trated among the largest miners.
Example 2. Let ci = 1 − 2−i. Note that X(1) =
∑
i(1 − ci) < 1, from which it follows
that c∗ > 1 (because X(c∗) = 1 and X is non-decreasing). Therefore, all miners participate
in equilibrium. However, in equilibrium we have xi = 1 − ci/c∗ ≥ 1 − ci = 2−i. So in
particular, Miner 1 controls at least half the mining power, and together with Miner 2
controls at least 3/4.
3.1 Proof of Theorem 1
The proof of Theorem 1 follows mostly from a clever manipulation of first-order condi-
tions. First, we state a helpful lemma showing that first-order conditions are necessary
and sufficient for identifying pure-strategy equilibria.
Lemma 2. Suppose that q˜ is an equilibrium in the proportional model. Then for each i,∑
j 6=i q˜j > 0, and
xi(q˜) = max(1− ci
∑
i
q˜i, 0). (2)
Furthermore, any q˜ satisfying (2) for all i is an equilibrium.
Proof. We first prove that if q˜ is an equilibrium, then for each i we have
∑
j 6=i q˜j > 0. If
this were not the case, then no q˜i > 0 can be a best response, as i could do better by
choosing qi = q˜i/2. However, q˜i = 0 also cannot be a best response, as i could do better
with any qi ∈ (0, 1/ci).
Next, note that Ui(q) = xi(q) − ciqi is continuous and differentiable in qi on {q :∑
j 6=i qj > 0}. Slightly abusing notation, for the remainder of this proof we define
x′i(q) =
∂xi(q)
∂qi
=
∂
∂qi
qi∑
j qj
=
1∑
j qj
− qi
(
∑
j qj)
2
=
1− xi(q)∑
j qj
≥ 0, (3)
and
U ′i(q) =
∂Ui(q)
∂qi
= x′i(q)− ci. (4)
Differentiability of Ui implies that if q˜i is a best response to q˜−i, then
U ′i(q˜) ≤ 0, with equality if q˜i > 0. (5)
In fact, these first-order conditions are sufficient to identify an equilibrium – that is, any
q˜ for which (5) holds for all i is an equilibrium. This is because Ui(q) is concave in qi. To
see this, note that (3) and (4) imply:
∂
∂qi
U ′i(q) =
∂
∂qi
x′i(q) =
−x′i(q)∑
j qj
− 1− xi(q)(∑
j qj
)2 = −2x′i(q)∑
j qj
≤ 0.
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It remains to show that (2) and (5) are equivalent. First, suppose that (5) holds. Then
by (3) and (4), for all i we have
U ′i(q˜) = x
′
i(q˜)− ci = (1− xi(q˜))/
∑
j
q˜j − ci ≤ 0, with equality if qi > 0.
Therefore if qi(q˜) > 0, we must have xi(q˜) = 1− ci
∑
j q˜j , and q˜i = xi(q˜) = 0 if and only if
ci
∑
j q˜j ≥ 1. In other words, (2) holds. Conversely, if (2) holds, then substituting into (3)
yields
x′i(q˜) =
1− xi(q˜)∑
j q˜j
=
1−max(1− ci
∑
j q˜j , 0)∑
j q˜j
.
Therefore,
i. if q˜i > 0, then xi(q˜) > 0 and x
′
i(q˜) = ci, so U
′
i(q˜) = x
′
i(q˜)− ci = 0.
ii. If q˜i = 0, then x
′
i(q˜) = 1/
∑
j q˜j ≤ ci, so U ′i(q˜) = x′i(q˜)− ci ≤ 0.
That is to say, (5) holds.
Lemma 2 drives the proof of Theorem 1. We first use Lemma 2 to claim that in any
equilibrium, miners with lower cost have greater market share.
Corollary 3. If q˜ is an equilibrium of the proportional model and ci ≤ cj, then q˜i ≥ q˜j.
That is, if miner j’s costs are no higher than those of miner i, then miner j invests at least
as much as miner i in equilibrium.
Proof. By Lemma 2, xi(q˜) = max(1− ci
∑
j q˜j , 0), which is weakly decreasing in ci.
Proof of Theorem 1. By Lemma 2, we know that q˜ is an equilibrium if and only if xi(q˜) =
max(1− ci
∑
j q˜j , 0) for all i. But by definition of xi, we have that
1 =
∑
i
xi(q˜) =
∑
i
max(1− ci
∑
j
q˜j , 0) = X(1/
∑
j
q˜j),
where X is as defined in (1). Therefore, Lemma 1 implies that
∑
j q˜j = 1/c
∗, so that
xi(q˜) = max(1− ci/c∗, 0) and q˜i = xi(q˜)
∑
j q˜ =
1
c∗ max(1− ci/c∗, 0). In other words, there
is exactly one equilibrium, and it is as described in Theorem 1.
Of theoretical (if not practical) interest, we note that the condition that n is finite is
important for Theorem 1 to hold. In particular, in Appendix B, we give an example with
countably many miners in which no equilibrium exists.
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4 Disproportional Rewards
In this section, we extend Theorem 1 (or more accurately, something closer to Corollary 2)
to a model with Economies of Scale (EoS). We call this the EoS model. The setup is almost
entirely the same: there are still n ≥ 2 miners competing for a prize of value 1. Each
miner chooses an investment qi, paying ciqi to do so. However, miners now share rewards
proportionally to qαi , for some parameter α ≥ 1. That is, miner i’s reward is qαi /
∑
j q
α
j .
We’ll use the same notation as the previous section and denote by xi(q) = q
α
i /
∑
j q
α
j miner
i’s market share. The miner’s utility is still xi(q)−ciqi. We proceed with the main theorem
statement of this section:
Theorem 2. Let q be any equilibrium in the EoS model. Then for all i, j (including i = j)
such that qi, qj > 0, xi(q) ≥ 1− 1α cicj .
Remark 1. Observe that Theorem 2 is almost a strict generalization of Corollary 2, except
for the assumption that qi > 0. This assumption is necessary, as the conclusion otherwise
does not hold (Example 3).
Observe also that Theorem 2 has bite even with perfectly symmetric costs. Theorem 2
immediately implies that anyone who participates at all has market share at least 1− 1/α
(by taking i = j), so therefore the number of agents who participate in any equilibrium is
at most 1 + 1α−1 . For example, if α = 1.05, then at most 21 miners will participate. If
α = 1.1, at most 11 will. If α > 2, there is no pure-strategy equilibrium.
4.1 Proof of Theorem 2
The proof of Theorem 2 is similar to that of Theorem 1, but does require some new ideas
(most notably, Proposition 1). We begin with a quick analysis of first-order conditions:
Lemma 3. Suppose that q is an equilibrium in the EoS model. Then for all i,
ciqi = α · xi(q)(1− xi(q)). (6)
Moreover, for all i, ci ≥ α · qα−1i · 1−xi(q)∑
j q
α
j
.10
Proof. Consider the derivative of xi(q) with respect to qi. We have that:
∂
∂qi
xi(q) =
∂
∂qi
qαi∑
j q
α
j
=
αqα−1i∑
j q
α
j
− αq
2α−1
i
(
∑
j q
α
j )
2
= αxi(q)/qi−αxi(q))2/qi = αxi(q) · (1− xi(q))
qi
As U ′i(q) = x
′
i(q) − ci, we immediately conclude that U ′i(q) ≤ 0 in equilibrium, with
equality if qi > 0. Therefore, ci ≥ x′i(q), with equality if qi > 0, resulting in Equation (6).
10Note that this is implied by Equation (6) when qi > 0, but needs a separate statement when qi = 0.
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The following corollary immediately follows (and proves the symmetric case of The-
orem 2, where ci = cj for all i, j). Below, we show that any miner who participates in
equilibrium must invest enough to achieve a market share of 1− 1/α. Observe that when
α = 1, this has no bite, as should be expected given our analysis of the proportional model.
Corollary 4. Suppose q is an equilibrium in the EoS model. Then for all i, xi(q) > 0 ⇒
xi(q) ≥ 1− 1/α.11
Proof. If xi(q) > 0, then the miner gets non-negative utility from participating, meaning
that xi(q) ≥ ciqi = αxi(q)(1 − xi(q)). Rearranging yields 1/α ≥ 1 − xi(q), and then
xi(q) ≥ 1− 1/α.
We next present an analog of Corollary 3, which states that if there is an equilibrium in
which miners i and j both participate, then the miner with lower costs will have a higher
market share.
Proposition 1. Let q be any equilibrium of the EoS model, and let qi ≥ qj > 0. Then
ci ≤ cj, and equality holds if and only if qi = qj.
Proof. Lemma 3 states that ciqi = αxi(q)(1 − xi(q)), and analogously for j. If qi, qj > 0,
we can note that qi = xi(q)
1/α (
∑
` q
α
` )
1/α and divide by xi(q)
1/α to get
ci
(∑
`
qα`
)1/α
= αxi(q)
1−1/α(1− xi(q)) = αf(xi(q)),
where we define f(x) = x1−1/α(1− x).
We know by Corollary 4 that xi(q) and xj(q) are both at least 1 − 1/α. Because
xi(q) ≥ xj(q) ⇔ qi ≥ qj , to prove the Proposition, it suffices to show that f is decreasing
on (1− 1/α, 1). But
f ′(x) = (1− 1/α)x−1/α(1− x)− x1−1/α = (1− 1/α)x−1/α − (2− 1/α)x1−1/α
=
2α− 1
α
x−1/α
(
α− 1
2α− 1 − x
)
.
Thus, f ′(x) < 0 for all x > α−12α−1 , and in particular for all x >
α−1
α , since
α−1
α ≥ α−12α−1 .
Proposition 1 is the main workhorse in the proof of Theorem 2, and the remainder
proof of the proof now follows quite easily.
11An inquisitive reader might note that this implies that no pure strategy equilibria exists if α > 2.
Intuitively, when α is large, non-existence may arise for a similar reason that pure-strategy equilibria fail
to exist in an all-pay auction: given any investment profile by others, a miner’s optimal choice is either to
invest just slightly more than the highest competitor, or nothing at all.
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Proof of Theorem 2. Let miner i and miner j both participate in q, and let ci ≤ cj . There-
fore, by Proposition 1, qj ≤ qi. We have from (6) that
ci
cj
qi
qj
=
xi(1− xi)
xj(1− xj) .
Solving for 1− xi and using the fact that xi/xj = qαi /qαj , we get:
(1− xi) = ci
cj
· xj
xi
· qi
qj
· (1− xj) = ci
cj
·
(
qj
qi
)α−1
· (1− xj) ≤ 1
α
· ci
cj
⇒ xi ≥ 1− 1
α
ci
cj
The final step follows because 1 − xj ≤ 1α (Corollary 4) and qj/qi ≤ 1 (hypothesis +
Proposition 1). This takes care of the case where ci ≤ cj . When ci ≥ cj , the theorem
immediately follows from Corollary 4.
As an aside for the interested reader, we note that the condition in Proposition 1 that
both miners choose to invest is necessary. As the following example shows, when α > 1, it is
possible that one miner invests in equipment, while a lower-cost miner abstains. Intuitively,
this occurs because in the presence of economies of scale, an inefficient incumbent can deter
a more efficient potential entrant.
Example 3. Fix an integer m ≥ 2, and consider the case with n > m miners, and
α = m/(m − 1), where c1 = (1 − 1/m)1−1/m < 1 = c2 = c3 = · · · = cn. Then for any
M ⊆ {2, 3, . . . , n} with |M | = m, there exists an equilibrium where qi = 1/m for i ∈ M ,
and qi = 0 for i 6∈ M (see Appendix A for a proof). When m = α = 2, these are in fact
the only equilibria. Observe that in all of these equilibria, q1 = 0, despite the fact that c1
is the lowest cost.
5 Conclusions and Discussion
In this paper, we argue that in the presence of minor cost asymmetries and economies of
scale, Bitcoin’s proof-of-work protocol incentivizes extreme concentration of mining power.
The observed dominance of large pools, which are themselves dominated by a few large min-
ing entities, is not a temporary aberration, but rather is likely to persist for the foreseeable
future. This conclusion has two broad implications for future cryptocurrency research.
First, people interested in understanding and making predictions about Bitcoin should
take into consideration that the vision of a large competitive market among miners is un-
likely to be fulfilled. For example, existing research often assumes that miners are “small”
[CKWN16, HLM17]. In light of our findings, it seems especially important to understand
which conclusions are sensitive to this assumption.
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Second, our findings motivate research into alternate cryptocurrencies in which cost
asymmetries and economies of scale are less pervasive. Much of the cost of Bitcoin mining
is driven by costs associated with powering and cooling hardware.12 Because electricity is
difficult to store and transport, its price varies widely with geography, implying that po-
tential miners in different locations face very different costs. Alternative solution concepts
like proof-of-stake [DPS16, GHM+17, KRDO17], where miners are selected in proportion
to their wealth (in the currency itself) rather than computational power, might address this
issue: while the cost of purchasing cryptocurrency may exhibit minor asymmetries across
investors, it is likely nowhere near the level of asymmetry observed in electricity prices.
Our work also highlights the importance of minimizing economies of scale. Ideally,
a miner’s expected return would be concave in their share of mining power. This seems
difficult to achieve in practice, as miners can always divide their hardware among several
false identities. At the very least, however, one would like to ensure that large Bitcoin
miners do not earn rewards exceeding their share of total mining power. Currently, this
might occur due to orphaned blocks or strategic manipulations of the Bitcoin protocol.
Below, we discuss each of these factors, and how they might be mitigated by alternative
cryptocurrency designs.
Due to network latency, it is possible that two miners find solutions to the cryptopuzzle
at “the same” time (meaning close enough that initially, neither is aware of the other).
These solutions and their associated block of transactions cannot both be added to the
ledger (this is part of Bitcoin’s “longest-chain protocol”), so the next miner to find a block
determines which block is added (earning a reward for its miner) and which is “orphaned”
(earns no reward). Miners are asked to tie-break in favor of the block they heard about first,
implying that larger miners are less likely to see their blocks orphaned (because they are
more likely to mine the subsequent block, and heard about their own block first). Therefore,
our work further motivates the design of protocols such as GHOST [SZ13], which aims
to greatly reduce the number of orphaned blocks, or Algorand [CM16, GHM+17], which
removes the concept of an orphaned block altogether.
While the Bitcoin protocol specifies how miners are supposed to behave, it cannot
enforce this behavior. Existing work [ES14, SSZ16, KKKT16, CKWN16] observes that
large miners may benefit from “selfish mining” or waiting to announce a block. For instance,
these strategies may allow a miner with (say) 10% of the total computational power to
reap (say) 11% of the total rewards in most existing cryptocurrencies (these are not exact
numbers). While most researchers recognize such deviations as problematic, the minor
gains are often cited as a mitigating factor (after all, the remaining 90% of miners still
enjoy 89% of the total rewards). Our work demonstrates that the possibility of such gains
may encourage mining power concentration, and therefore supports the importance of
12For instance, one can purchase a state-of-the-art AntMiner S9 for roughly 2000 USD. The estimated
cost to power it for a year in an average US home is roughly the same amount. Larger miners achieve
roughly the same ratio: their electricity is considerably cheaper and they also receive bulk discounts for
initial purchase (https://www.buybitcoinworldwide.com/mining/profitability/).
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designing incentive compatible protocols.
Our model assumes that the value of the block reward is exogenous to the behavior of
Bitcoin miners. While the frequency of block creation and the number of bitcoins awarded
to the block creator are fixed by the Bitcoin protocol, the value of these bitcoins in, say, US
Dollars is determined by market forces. It is plausible that the price of Bitcoin is influenced
by its perceived stability, in which case Bitcoin’s value might drop as mining power became
more concentrated, and rise as (aggregate) mining power increased. Because we believe
that most fluctuations in Bitcoin’s price are driven by speculation rather than assessments
of its fundamentals, we leave a formal treatment of these effects to future work.
Another abstraction in this paper is to treat the acquisition of mining power as a one-
time investment, when in reality new hardware can be purchased at any time. Because we
focus on pure-strategy equilibria, so long as the value of Bitcoin (and cost of hardware)
is stable over time, miners will have no incentive to wait to acquire hardware. In reality,
of course, fluctuating Bitcoin prices may provide miners with incentives to acquire new
hardware, or to stop powering existing hardware. While a full analysis of these incentives
is beyond the scope of this work, we note that adding dynamics to the game doesn’t
change the fact that miners are investing resources to compete over a fixed prize, nor does
it change our conclusion that seemingly small cost asymmetries or advantages to scale
provide incentives for mining power to become highly concentrated.
Finally, recall that we choose to isolate two key factors (cost asymmetry and economies
of scale) and demonstrate that these factors alone transparently imply centralization of
mining power. There are numerous nuances to Bitcoin mining (in addition to those de-
scribed immediately above) which are certainly interesting to investigate in future work,
but explicitly modeling these nuances would not change the underlying thesis of this paper:
proof of work protocols result in high concentration of mining power in the presence of even
minor cost asymmetries or economies of scale.
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A Proof of Example 3
Before getting into our proof, we’ll need the following facts about equilibria in the EoS
model. In the proportional model, utilities are concave in investment, so first-order con-
ditions suffice to verify an equilibrium. In the EoS model, utilities are not concave in
investment. In principle, this means one might need to appeal to global optimality condi-
tions, but fortunately there is still some similar structure, which will be crucial in order to
tractably analyze equilibria. Lemma 4 provides “concave-like” structure on the utilities,
and is used to prove Corollary 5, which is our key structural insight for examples in the
EoS model.
Lemma 4. Utilities in the EoS model are initially convex, and then concave. Specifically,
Ui(q) is strictly convex in qi when xi(q) ∈ [0, α−12α ) and strictly concave when xi(q) ∈
(α−12α , 1).
Proof. As in Lemma 3, recall that ∂∂qixi(q) = αxi(q)(1−xi(q))/qi and ∂∂qiUi(q) = α ·xi(q) ·
(1− xi(q))/qi − ci. So:
∂
∂qi
(
∂
∂qi
Ui(q)
)
= α ·
(1− 2xi(q)) · ∂xi(q)∂qi
qi
− α · xi(q)(1− xi(q))
q2i
= α ·
(1− 2xi(q)) · ∂xi(q)∂qi
qi
− α ·
qi
α · ∂xi(q)∂qi
q2i
=
∂xi(q)
∂qi
qi
· (α− 2xi(q)− 1).
Observe that ∂xi(q)∂qi > 0, and qi > 0, and α − 2αxi(q) − 1 is initially positive but strictly
decreasing in qi, hitting 0 when xi(q) =
α−1
2α .
Corollary 5. For all q−i, the best response of miner i is either to invest the value q∗i such
that xi(q
∗
i ; q−i) ≥ α−12α and ∂∂qiUi(q∗i ; q−i) = 0, or to invest nothing if such a q∗i does not
exist.
Now we proceed to analyze the example. Recall that we wish to show that when
α = m/(m− 1), c1 is sufficiently large and ci = 1 for all i ≥ 2, that it is an equilibrium for
any m miners with index ≥ 2 to each invest 1/m, and all other miners to invest 0.
First, consider the reward of any miner who is investing at the proposed strategy profile:
it is exactly 1/m− 1/m = 0. Moreover, i’s market share at the proposed strategy profile is
1/m > α−12α =
1
2m . By Corollary 5, it therefore suffices to show that first-order conditions
are satisfied to prove that miner i is best responding. By Lemma 3, first-order conditions
are satisfied, as ciqi = 1/m = α · 1/m · (m− 1)/m = α · xi(q)(1− xi(q)).
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Finally, we just need to make sure that all miners who choose not to participate are
best responding as well. Note that because there are m other miners each investing 1/m,
x1(q) = q
α
1 /(q
α
1 +m(1/m)
α) = qα1 /(q
α
1 +m
−1/(m−1)). Therefore:
x1(q) =
qα1
qα1 +m
−1/(m−1)
⇒ qα1 x1(q) + x1(q)m−1/(m−1) = qα1
⇒ qα1 (1− x1(q)) = x1(q)m−1/(m−1)
⇒ q1 =
(
x1(q)m
−1/(m−1)/(1− x1(q))
)1/α
Now, we want to make use of Lemma 3, which states that if miner 1 is best responding,
then c1q1 = αx1(q)(1− x1(q)). Specifically, we wish to find the value of ci such that miner
1’s best response is to target a market share of 1/m. Continuing from above, we get:
x1(q) = 1/m, 1− x1(q) = 1− 1/m, α = 1 + 1/(m− 1), q1 =
(
x1(q) ·m−1/(m−1)/(1− x1(q))
)1/α
,
c1q1 = αx1(q)(1− x1(q))
⇒ q1 =
(
m−1/(m−1)/(m− 1)
)(m−1)/m
= m−1/m · (m− 1)−(m−1)/m.
⇒ c1m−1/m · (m− 1)−(m−1)/m = m
m− 1 ·
1
m
· m− 1
m
= 1/m.
⇒ c1 = m−1+1/m · (m− 1)1−1/m = (1− 1/m)1−1/m.
This implies that when c1 = (1− 1/m)1−1/m, the best response of miner 1 is either to
target a market share of 1/m, or invest 0. In fact, both are best responses and yield 0
utility, as we solved for c1q1 = 1/m. This allows us to conclude that if c1 = (1−1/m)1−1/m,
it is a best response for miner 1 to not invest. This further allows us to conclude that when
c1 > (1− 1/m)1−1/m, it is a best response for miner 1 to not invest (as all strategies aside
from not investing become strictly less attractive). Therefore, miner 1’s best response is
to not invest whenever c1 ≥ (1− 1/m)1−1/m.
To see that these are the only possible equilibria when α = 2, observe by Corollary 4
that in any equilibrium there must be exactly two miners who participate and they must
have market share exactly 1/2. Assume for contradiction that one of them is miner 1 (and
the other is some i > 1). Lemma 3 then implies that c1q1 = 1/2 = ciqi. But if they each
have market share 1/2, we must have q1 = qi. As c1 < ci, there is no equilibrium of this
form.
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B No Equilibrium when n =∞
In this section we show an example (based on Example 2) with countably many miners
where no equilibrium exists, despite the fact that an equilibrium exists for every finite
prefix, and the sequence of equilibria converge as n→∞.
Example 4. For the rest of this section, let ci = 1− 2−i−k, for any k > 0.
Proposition 2. In Example 4, there is no equilibrium where finitely many miners partic-
ipate.
Proof. Assume for contradiction that an equilibrium q exists with finitely many miners,
and let n denote the least efficient miner to participate. Consider instead the finite instance
that contains only miners 1, . . . , n + 1. Then clearly q(n+1) (q restricted to its first n + 1
coordinates) is an equilibrium for this game. Specifically, as far as the first n+1 miners can
tell, q is identical with or without miners > n+ 1, because they don’t participate anyway.
So if each of them are best responding in q, they are certainly best responding in q(n+1).
By Theorem 1, there is a unique such equilibrium. Observe that X(1) =
∑
i(1−ci) < 1,
from which it follows that c∗ > 1 (because X(c∗) = 1 and X is non-decreasing). Therefore,
all miners choose to participate as ci < c
∗. However, by definition of n, miner n + 1 does
not participate in q (and therefore also does not participate in q(n+1)), so q(n+1) is not an
equilibrium for the game restricted to the first n+ 1 miners, and therefore q cannot be an
equilibrium.
Observation 1. When Example 4 is restricted to n <∞ miners, every miner chooses to
participate and miner i’s market share is 1−2
−k+2−k−n+(n−1)2−i−k
n−2−k+2−k−n . Observe that for all i,
as n→∞, the market share approaches 2−i−k from above.
Observation 1 suggests that there should be an equilibrium of Example 4 where miner
i’s market share is 2−i−k. Something of course seems off about this, because the market
shares would then sum to 2−k < 1 (as k > 0). Indeed, there is no such equilibrium, and in
fact no equilibrium at all.
Proposition 3. In Example 4, there is no equilibrium where infinitely many miners par-
ticipate.
Proof. Assume for contradiction that some equilibrium exists, and let T =
∑
i qi denote the
total investment in mining. Note that T < ∞ as the total reward is 1, and the minimum
possible cost for investment T is T · (1− 2−1−k). So we must have T ≤ 1/(1− 2−1−k).
Now consider any miner i, who invests qi. Then their reward for choosing to in-
vest q′i instead is exactly
q′i
T−qi+q′i − ciq
′
i, whose derivative is
1
T−qi+q′i −
q′i
(T−qi+q′i)2 − ci =
T−qi−ci(T−qi+q′i)2
(T−qi+q′i)2 . In fact, miner i’s best response is to invest max{0,
√
(T − qi)/ci − (T −
qi)}. So if miner i is investing at all, we must have qi =
√
(T − qi)/ci− (T −qi). Therefore,
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we get the following implications (where S denotes the set of miners who participate in the
assumed equilibrium):
qi =
√
(T − qi)/ci − T + qi
⇒ T 2 = T/ci − qi/ci
⇒ qi = ciT 2 − T
⇒
∑
i∈S
qi =
∑
i∈S
(
ciT
2 − T )
⇒ 1 =
∑
i∈S
(ciT − 1) .
Note that this equation simply doesn’t hold for any T . If T < 1, then the RHS diverges
to −∞ (recall that S is countably infinite). If T > 1, then the RHS diverges to +∞. If
T = 1, then the RHS is upper bounded by 2−k (in the case that S = N), which is strictly
less than one.
The above propositions combine to yield Theorem 3.
Theorem 3. In Example 4, there exists a unique equilibrium for every prefix of n < ∞
miners, and miner i’s investment in these equilibria converges from above to 2−k−i. Yet,
there exists no equilibrium for Example 4 (or in fact any infinite subset of miners).
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